Soap-bubbles, crystals and ant colonies; self-assembly is everywhere, yet few know what self-assembly is and how it became an important scientific concept.

In my work, I have explored the epistemology and history of self-assembly, arguing that it emerged as a key concept in the formation of molecular biology and as a fundamental principle of biological organization. Since then, chemists have been drawn to the intricate and delicate architectures found in living systems and seek to replicate self-assembly through nanofabrication methods.

Now, self-assembly lies at the forefront of understanding how life can perform work.

Why is the world not boring?

Stripes, branches, spirals – the world is full of interesting shapes. One reason for this is that order can emerge spontaneously through a process known as self-organization.

In recent work I have analyzed the epistemological role of self-organization in the scientific study of complexity. Especially in developing organisms, self-organization is part of a growing appreciation that genetic, molecular and emergent physical forces collectively interact to give rise to tissues and organs.

How do we integrate self-organization into existing research pipelines in developmental biology and what can it teach us about the causal complexity of life? These are pressing philosophical questions.

How is the mind connected to the body? I have approached this question by applying models of complexity from the life sciences to theoretical frameworks of cognition.

My work on life-mind continuity within enactivist approaches to cognition argues that existing accounts of the relationship between life and mind overlook several important distinctions. To address this, I have proposed a classificatory framework to guide future research.

More recently, I have shifted toward a medical focus in collaboration with Aarhus University Hospital. Together, we have been investigating functional somatic disorders, contending that these conditions challenge prevailing conceptions of disease and call for more nuanced accounts of how cognition and experience influence physiology.

How can we come to know the world through concepts?

In my work I have advocated for a pragmatist account of epistemology. We are bounded finite creatures that communally come to know the world through tool-mediated interactions. An appropriate philosophical understanding of science should therefore attend to how concepts are embedded within social systems, by which practices they make contact their target phenomena, and which aims they serve.

Philosophy contributes to science by clarifying its conceptual foundations and by relating its practices and knowledge to the existential conundrum within which mortal creatures find themselves embroiled.